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1     Introduction 
 
This paper uses data on firms’ incorporation choices to study the market for 
corporate law in the United States. In particular, the paper focuses on the demand-
side of this market, studying the determinants of firms’ incorporation decisions. 
Analyzing these decisions is valuable for understanding the patterns of 
incorporation and the outcomes of regulatory competition in the corporate area.  
A central feature of the US corporate environment is the presence of regulatory 
competition in corporate law. Corporations are free to choose their state of 
incorporation, and they are subject to the corporate law of the state in which they 
have chosen to incorporate. Whether and to what extent this regulatory competition 
works well has long been one of the most hotly debated questions among corporate 
law scholars. As European corporations have recently become free to choose their 
country of incorporation among the EEC countries, this question has also become 
important in Europe.  
According to the view that appears to dominate the current thinking of 
corporate law academics, state competition produces a “race-toward-the-top” that 
benefits shareholders (see Winter (1977, 1989), Easterbrook and Fischel (1991), 
Fischel (1982) and Romano (1993a, 1993b, 1998)). On this view, the desire to attract 
incorporations induces states to develop and provide corporate arrangements that 
enhance shareholder value. An alternative view is more skeptical with respect to the 
incentives provided by state competition (see, e.g.,  Cary (1974), Bebchuk (1992), 
Bar-Gill, Barzuza, and Bebchuk (2001)). On this view, competition encourages states 
to provide rules that are too favorable to corporate managers and controllers with 
respect to corporate issues, such as takeover rules, that have a major effect on the 
private benefits of managers and controllers.  
In this debate, most scholars have made similar assumptions about the supply 
side of the market, namely, that states seek to attract incorporations, but they 
differed in their views on the demand side, namely, on what type of rules would 
make states more successful in attracting incorporations. Note, however, that the 
demand side would be important even if one were to relax the assumption that 
states seek to maximize the number of incorporations. Even if some or many states 
selected their corporate rules on the basis of considerations other than such 
maximization, the demand side would determine the distribution of firms among 
whatever choices states would provide.  
The debate on state competition has stimulated a large body of empirical 
research. This research has largely focused on analyzing how shareholder wealth is 
affected by incorporating in Delaware (see Bhagat and Romano (2001), Romano  
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(2001), and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2002) for surveys of this work). Several 
studies have suggested that reincorporations to Delaware are associated with 
abnormal returns (see, e.g., Romano (1985), Heron and Lewellen (1998)). In addition, 
a recent, influential study by Daines (2001a) suggested that incorporation in 
Delaware is correlated with a higher Tobin’s Q. However, Bebchuk, Cohen, and 
Ferrell (2002) argue that selection issues make it difficult to infer from existing 
studies that a Delaware incorporation has a positive effect on shareholder wealth. 
They also point out that, if such an effect did exist, it would not teach us much about 
how well state competition works overall; because of the network benefits from 
incorporating in the dominant state, doing so would be beneficial even in an 
equilibrium in which state competition does not work well.1 
In any event, the existing empirical work does not examine some significant 
aspects of the incorporation market on which this paper focuses. Whereas prior 
work has only examined how the market is divided between Delaware and non-
Delaware firms, this paper studies the distribution of incorporations among all 
states and thus, in turn, how states other than Delaware differ in their performance 
in the market for incorporations. Furthermore, whereas prior work has taken 
incorporation decisions as given, we seek to investigate the determinants of these 
incorporation decisions.  
In particular, we investigate which features of corporate law systems make 
them more and less successful in attracting incorporations. We also study how 
incorporation choices are influenced by firms’ location and, finding such influence, 
we investigate the reasons for its existence. The results we report are for the set of all 
non-financial firms; the results for the set of all firms are similar and are reported in 
an earlier version of this paper (Bebchuk and Cohen (2002)).  
We start by providing a full account of the distribution of incorporations 
among states. Putting aside Delaware, states still differ greatly both in their ability to 
retain firms headquartered (“located”) in them and in their ability to attract out-of-
state incorporations. For example, whereas Illinois and California retain only 11% 
and 22% of the firms located in them respectively, Indiana and Minnesota retain 
70% and 75% respectively. As to out-of-state incorporations, 33 states attract less 
than 10 out-of-state incorporations each, whereas 7 states attract more than 25 out-
of-state incorporations each.  
                                                 
1 Bar-Gill, Barzuza, and Bebchuk (2001) develop a formal model of a race-to-the-bottom 
equilibrium in which (i) states are induced to provide rules that provide managers with 
excessive private benefits and (ii) incorporation in the dominant state is associated with a higher 
shareholder value due to the institutional advantages and network benefits offered by this state.  
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We next turn to study the characteristics of firms that influence their decisions 
whether to seek out-of-state incorporation. The location of firms has substantial 
influence on incorporation decisions: Firms display substantial “home-state 
preference” in favor of incorporating in the state in which they are located.2 States 
thus enjoy a significant “home-state advantage” in competing for the firms located 
in them, and they generally have much greater ability to attract incorporations from 
in-state firms than from out-of-state firms. Even states that are hardly able to attract 
out-of-state firms (i.e., whose corporate law system is rarely “purchased” by out-of-
state “buyers”) generally succeed in retaining a significant fraction of their in-state 
firms. Thus, in contrast to the conventional picture of state competition, states do not 
compete on equal footing for all publicly traded firms, and competition is 
significantly more imperfect than is conventionally assumed.  
We also investigate why firms’ location has such an influence on incorporation 
choices and when the home-state advantage is more and less strong. We find that 
the home-state bias is weaker, though still significant, among large firms and among 
firms that went public more recently. We discuss four factors that can lead firms to 
disfavor out-of-state incorporation, and we find evidence consistent with three 
stories – ones based on (i) the higher costs of out-of-state incorporations, (ii) the 
desire of firms to benefit from local favoritism, and (iii) the influence of local 
lawyers. For example, we find that large firms are more likely to remain in-state 
when they are located in small states where their clout enables them to obtain some 
benefits from local favoritism. The evidence, however, is inconsistent with a story 
based on firms’ having no reason to leave states that have adopted the uniform 
Model Business Corporation Act; firms located in such states do not exhibit a greater 
tendency to remain in-state. 
We then turn to examine how states’ corporate law systems affect their 
performance in terms of both retaining in-state firms and attracting out-of-state 
incorporations. Our focus here is on the effect of states’ antitakeover statutes. As will 
be discussed, the dominant view among legal scholars, supported by some 
empirical work, is unfavorable to the proliferation of such state statutes. Supporters 
of state competition, however, argue that it has not encouraged such proliferation. 
They believe that the incorporation market does not reward the amassing of 
antitakeover statutes but rather rewards states that are more resistant to pressure by 
                                                 
2 That location might affect choices was suggested by the observation made in Daines (1999) 
that the majority of firms incorporate either in their home state or in Delaware. In a work in 
progress, Daines (2002) is conducting a study of firms’ home-state preferences at the time of the 
IPO. The results of Daines’ study, which is based on IPO-date data, can be expected to 
complement our examination of this issue, which is based on Compustat data on the stock of all 
firms existing at the end of 1999.     
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local firms’ managers for antitakeover protection. We test this prediction and find it 
to be inconsistent with the evidence.  
At one end of the spectrum, states with no antitakeover statutes, such as 
California, do poorly and retain a relatively small fraction of the companies located 
in them. At the other end of the spectrum, states that amass most or all standard 
antitakeover statutes are the ones most successful both in retaining in-state firms 
and in attracting out-of-state firms. More generally, antitakeover protections are 
correlated with success in the incorporation market; adding antitakeover statutes 
significantly increases the ability of states to retain their local firms, as well as their 
ability to attract out-of-state incorporations.  
The effect we identify is not only statistically significant but also large in 
magnitude. Controlling for other firm and state characteristics, we estimate that, had 
states that currently have all standard antitakeover statutes not adopted them, they 
would have lost more than half of the incorporations of local firms they currently 
h a v e  ( g o i n g  d o w n  f r o m  4 9 %  of  a l l  f i r m s  l o c a t e d  in  t h e s e  s t a t e s  t o  2 3 %  o f  t h e s e  
firms)). Conversely, adopting all standard antitakeover statutes by states that 
currently have no such statutes would have more than doubled the percentage of 
local firms retained by them (from 23% to 50%).  
We pay special attention to two types of statutes – the “recapture” or 
“disgorgement” statute adopted by Pennsylvania and Ohio and the mandatory 
staggered boards statute adopted by Massachusetts. These statutes have been 
widely criticized as detrimental to shareholder value, and supporters of state 
competition have blacklisted them as extreme (see, e.g., Romano (1993), Daines 
(2001a)). However, we find that, in contrast to the beliefs of state competition 
supporters, the passage of these statutes has not hurt the states adopting them in the 
incorporation market. 
Thus, the antitakeover protections established by Pennsylvania, Ohio, and 
Massachusetts do not reach the level that would start discouraging incorporators. In 
contrast to amassing standard antitakeover statutes, however, having extreme 
statutes has not increased incorporations in these states. Thus, it might be that the 
adoption of such statutes is close to the outer limits of how far a state can go in 
providing antitakeover protections without discouraging incorporations. 3   
                                                 
3 In contemporaneous work, Subramanian (2002) also examines the effects of antitakeover 
statutes on the ability of states to retain their local firms. As will be discussed in Section 4, his 
conclusions on this issue are consistent with ours with respect to standard antitakeover statutes 
but not with respect to extreme statutes. He does not study the effect of states’ antitakeover 
statutes on their success in attracting out-of-state incorporations and the overall effect that 
migration of firms to out-of-state incorporations has on the level of antitakeover protection.    
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Our findings indicate that it is not possible to maintain, as the dominant view 
among corporate scholars has done, that (i) state antitakeover statutes largely do not 
serve shareholders, and (ii) state competition provides states with strong incentives 
to provide rules that are optimal for shareholders. One or both of these two 
propositions need to be revised. Whatever position one ultimately adopts, the 
identified connection between antitakeover statutes and success in the incorporation 
marketplace has significant implications for the debates on state competition, on 
takeover law, and on corporate governance in general.  
We also find some other features of states that have an effect on how they fare 
in the incorporation market. For example, states that have more “liberal” culture, 
which might be associated with judicial activism, are less successful in retaining in-
state companies. States that have adopted the Revised Model Business Corporation 
Act (or its predecessor) are not more successful in attracting incorporations either 
form local firms or from out-of-state firms. The approach that we put forward can 
also be used to identify other features of states that make them attractive for 
incorporators. 
We end the empirical analysis by analyzing concentration and market structure 
in the incorporation market. Recent work by Kamar (1998) and by Kahan and Kamar 
(2001) highlighted the importance of understanding the sources and consequences 
of Delaware’s dominance in the incorporation market. Studying Delaware’s 
dominance in the market, we find that this dominance is stronger than has been 
recognized and that it is likely to keep growing. Given the presence of home-state 
bias, we argue, it is useful to evaluate Delaware’s market dominance not only by 
looking at its share of all incorporations, as had been conventionally done, but also 
by looking at its share of out-of-state incorporations. In this respect, we find, 
Delaware’s share of the market for out-of-state incorporations is exceedingly high. 
We also find that both the fraction of firms that go out-of-state, and Delaware’s 
fraction of out-of-state incorporations, have been steadily increasing. Thus, if 
Delaware just maintains its performance with respect to firms from recent cohorts, 
its share of total incorporations can be expected to continue climbing from current 
levels.  
Our analysis is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and provides 
summary statistics about the patterns of incorporations. Section 3 studies firms’ 
home-state preferences and the factors that pull firms in the direction of in-state 
incorporation. Section 4 investigates how states’ corporate law rules, and especially 
antitakeover statutes, affect their success in attracting incorporations. Section 5 
analyzes the division and structure of the incorporation market and Delaware’s  
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dominance in this market. Section 6 makes concluding remarks and suggests 
directions for subsequent empirical work on the subject.  
 
2     Data and Summary Statistics 
 
The data set that we use includes all the publicly traded firms for which there 
was data in the Compustat database at the end of 1999 and which have both their 
headquarters and their incorporation in the United States.4 Following Daines 
(2001a), who argues that financial firms are different in their corporate governance 
needs and their incorporation decisions are sometimes influenced by some special 
considerations, we excluded all financial firms and were left with 6,530 publicly 
traded firms. As already noted, an earlier version of this paper (Bebchuk and Cohen 
(2002)) reports results for the set of all firms (both financial and nonfinancial) and 
these results are qualitatively quite similar to the ones reported below.  
Table 1 displays how firms are distributed among states of location for all 
publicly traded firms, for all Fortune 500 firms, and for all firms that went public in 
the five-year period 1996-2000. By states of location we shall refer throughout the 
paper to the state where the firm’s headquarters are located (which is the only 
location data provided by Compustat). We shall refer to the fifty-one jurisdictions in 
the US – the fifty states and the District of Columbia – as states.  
Not surprisingly, states that have large populations and big economies have 
more firms located in them. California, with the biggest population and economy, is 
home to the headquarters of 19% of all firms. Its share is especially large (27%) 
among firms that went public in the period 1996-2000, presumably because of the 
large incidence of Silicon Valley firms going public in these years. New York and 
Texas come second and third, each with about 9% of the firms. In an unreported 
regression, we find that the number of firms located in a state is highly correlated 
with the size of its population.  
Table 2 displays the distribution of incorporations among states for all publicly 
traded firms, for all Fortune 500 firms, and for all firms going public in the five-year 
period 1996-2000. Comparing Table 2 with Table 1 indicates that the distribution of 
locations and the distribution of incorporations are quite different. As is well 
known, Delaware has by far the largest stake of incorporations: 58% of all firms, 59% 
of Fortune 500 firms, and even a higher percentage – 68% – of firms that went public 
in the period 1996-2000.  
                                                 
4 This point in time was the most recent one for which there was data for the great majority of 
firms when we did our empirical analysis.    
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Although no state even comes close to Delaware in terms of the number of 
incorporations, some states do much better than others. Whereas three states have 
more than 200 incorporations each, and eight states have between 100 and 200 
incorporations each, thirty states have less than 50 incorporations each, with 
seventeen states having less than 10 incorporations each.  
These two tables do not indicate where the firms located in each state choose to 
incorporate, nor where the firms incorporated in each state are located. Table 3 
therefore presents a matrix that indicates for each state how the firms located in it 
divide their incorporations between this state and all other states. A quite noticeable 
feature of Table 3 is the concentration of firms in the boxes along the diagonal, 
which contain the numbers of in-state incorporations for each and every state. The 
large concentration of firms along this diagonal suggests the possible presence of a 
significant home-state advantage. Another noticeable and expected feature of Table 
3 is the significant concentration of firms in the various boxes of one vertical column 
– that of Delaware; the column clearly indicates that Delaware is able to attract 
incorporations from all but one state.   
Table 4 presents the total number and percentage of firms incorporated in their 
home state – among all firms, firms going public during 1991-1995 and during 1996-
2000, Fortune 500 firms, and Fortune 100 firms. The table indicates that there is a 
substantial percentage of in-state incorporation in all groups. The fraction of in-state 
incorporations is smaller for firms that are large and for firms that went public in the 
90’s. However, even among Fortune 100 firms, and among firms that went public in 
the past five years, the fraction of in-state incorporations is significant (about 25% in 
each case).  
Tables 5 displays how each state fares in the “market for corporate law.” The 
table indicates for each state (i) how many of its in-state firms it retains, both in 
absolute numbers and as a percentage of all in-state firms; (ii) how many out-of-
state firms it attracts, both in absolute number and as a percentage of all out-of-state 
incorporations; and (iii) its net outflow (inflow) of firms. This table indicates that the 
large majority of states are net “exporters” of firms. Other than Delaware, which is a 
huge “importer,” only Nevada has a significant net inflow of firms (154). The table 
also indicates that states vary greatly in how successful they are in the incorporation 
marketplace, both in terms of retaining in-state firms and in terms of attracting out-






3     Home-State Advantage and Its Sources  
 
3.1    The Presence of Home-State Advantage   
 
The literature on state competition has generally viewed the incorporation 
choice of publicly traded firms as a “stand-alone” choice, one that depends only on 
judgment as to which state’s corporate law system would be best, and that is 
independent of the state where the firm is located. US firms incorporated in any 
given state may transact on equal footing in any state. Consequently, being 
incorporated in any other state is not supposed to affect how a firm’s operations are 
going to be taxed or regulated. Similarly, the corporate law of any given state, which 
largely affects the relationship between shareholders and managers, applies equally 
to all the firms incorporated in that state regardless of where they are located.  
For these reasons, the conventional view regards incorporation choices as a 
“pure” choice of a legal regime, based only on a comparison of states’ corporate law 
systems and a judgment on which of those systems would be best for the firm. And 
the corporate law rules that would best fit any given firm might depend on various 
features of the firm, its shareholders, or its managers, but there is no good reason to 
expect them to depend on the particular location of the firm’s headquarters. On this 
view, all states are viewed as “selling” their corporate law system to all publicly 
traded firms, and not especially to the firms located in them. If this picture were 
indeed accurate, we could expect some states to be more successful than others in 
attracting a given type of firm, but we would not expect a state to be more successful 
(controlling for firm characteristics) in attracting local firms than out-of-state firms.  
This conventional picture was put in doubt by the report of Daines (1999) that 
most firms incorporate either in their home state or in Delaware. Our data confirms 
the presence of a strong home-state advantage. There is a very heavy concentration 
of firms along the boxes of the diagonal of Table 3. Tables 5 indicates that states are 
generally much more attractive to their in-state firms than to out-of-state firms. Even 
states that do rather poorly with respect to out-of-state firms do succeed in retaining 
a significant fraction of their own firms.   
For example, as Table 5 displays, California, which does relatively poorly on 
both dimensions, still does far better for in-state firms, retaining 22% of them, than 
for out-of-state firms, attracting only 0.2% of them – (see Table 5). Altogether, 
California is the incorporation choice of 273 firms located in California (out of a total 
of 1,254 firms headquartered in California) but only 10 firms located elsewhere (out 
of a total of 4,393 incorporated out-of-state). Although California appears unable to 
“sell” its corporate law system to any significant number of out-of-state firms, it  
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does have a significant number of incorporations because it starts with a large stock 
of local firms with respect to which it has some home-state advantage.  
To test systematically the difference in states’ abilities to attract in-state and 
out-of-state firms, we ran for each given state that has 10 or more firms located in it 
the following logit regression. We regressed a dummy variable that has a value of 1 
if a company incorporates in the given state and 0 otherwise on (i) various 
characteristics of the firm – specifically, the company’s sales (log), the company’s 
Tobin’s Q, the company’s return on assets, the company’s number of employees, the 
company’s total equity, and dummy variables reflecting whether the company went 
public in 1996-2000, 1991-1995, or before 1990, and (ii) a dummy variable that has a 
value of 1 if the company is located in the given state and 0 otherwise. In all the 
regressions, being located in the state increased the likelihood of incorporating in 
the state at 99% confidence.  To illustrate, Table 6 displays one of these regressions, 
the one applying to California. The table indicates that the coefficient for being 
located in California is positive and large (at 99% confidence). Similar results are 
obtained in the other regressions. 5  
 
3.2      Factors Pulling toward Remaining In-state  
 
As noted, if firms were paying attention only to the relative quality of the 
corporate law system offered by states, firms’ incorporation decisions would not be 
influenced by their location. What explains firms’ giving preference to incorporating 
in their home state? Below we will test four other stories that might help explain 
why firms are pulled in the direction of remaining in-state:  
(i) The Extra Costs Pull: It might be suggested that the presence of home-state 
bias emerges from firms’ desire to avoid the extra costs that might be involved in 
going outside the state. Incorporation in Delaware involves a franchise tax and filing 
fees that are non-negligible, even though not very substantial for most publicly 
traded firms. Also, incorporating out-of-state might involve some additional 
transaction costs resulting from the need to retain additional law firms or to conduct 
legal business at a distance.6  
                                                 
5 It is worth reminding the reader that by state of location we refer to the state where the firm’s 
headquarters are located which is the only location variable on your Compustat. To the extent 
that some firms have their main location and their incorporation in a state other than where 
they are headquartered, the home-state advantage might be even stronger than suggested by 
our results.  
6 According to Cumming and MacIntosh (2001), Canadian lawyers whom the authors 
interviewed note the extra costs involved in out-of-province incorporation as an important 
reason for incorporating in the province of location.  
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Because the extra costs of going out of state are unlikely to rise proportionately 
with firm size, these costs can be expected to weigh more heavily on smaller firms, 
and smaller firms can be thus expected to display stronger tendencies to incorporate 
in-state. Note that, because extra costs are likely to be trivial for firms that are very 
large, and because home-state bias is still present to some extent for Fortune 500 and 
Fortune 100 firms (see Table 4), the extra costs story cannot provide a full 
explanation for the observed home-state bias; the question is thus only whether the 
extra costs story plays a significant role. 
(ii) The Uniformity Story: A complementary story to the extra costs story can be 
based on the fact that many states have substantially similar corporate law codes 
that are all based on the Revised Model Business Corporation Act (RMBCA) (or its 
predecessor, the Model Business Corporation Act).7 The Revised Model Act is a 
sample statute, put together by a committee of corporate scholars and practitioners, 
that many states have adopted wholesale. For all firms that prefer being subject to 
the RBMCA and are headquartered in a state that has adopted the RMBCA, so the 
story goes, even a tiny cost of going out-of-state might serve as a tie-breaker and 
lead to remaining in their state of headquarters.8 A problem with this story is that, 
even among states that have adopted the RMBCA, there is significant variance in the 
additional antitakeover statutes (if any) that were adopted. In any event, the 
prediction of this story is that firms located in states with the RMBCA will show 
stronger tendencies to incorporate in-state.  
(iii) The Local Favoritism Story: A third factor that might lead some firms to give 
preference to in-state incorporation is the hope of getting favorable treatment. Even 
though a state is supposed to treat all firms incorporated in it in the same way 
regardless of where they are located, a firm located in a state – especially a large 
firm located in a small state – might hope that its stature and clout in the state 
would lead judges or public officials to give it a favorable treatment with respect to 
some corporate law issues that might arise. Similarly, a firm located in a state might 
expect that, if it displays “loyal citizenship” by incorporating in the state, it would 
increase its chances of getting favorable treatment from public officials on issues 
unrelated to corporate law that might arise in the firm’s dealings with the state. 
A testable prediction of the local favoritism story concerns the interaction of 
firm size and state size. A large firm located in a small state might have a major 
presence (the big fish in a small pond phenomenon) and can have significant clout 
                                                 
7 For a detailed description and a list of the states adopting the RMBCA, and its close 
predecessor the MBCA, see Section of Business Law of the American Bar Association (1999).  
8 We are grateful to Frank Easterbrook for suggesting this possible story and for stressing the 
importance of controlling for the RMBCA factor.  
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that can enable it to get local favoritism (Sitkoff (2002)). In contrast, a firm of a 
similar size that is located in a big state will not be able to stand out and thus is 
unlikely to be able to obtain local favoritism. Thus, the local favoritism story 
predicts that, for large firms of any given size, those located in a small state will 
have a greater tendency to remain in-state.9  
(iv) The Law Firm Factor: A fourth factor that might pull some firms in the 
direction of in-state incorporation is that of agency costs in the market for legal 
services. Recent work by Coates (2001) demonstrates that agency problems between 
lawyers and owners-managers might influence choices made at the IPO stage. In 
particular, it shows that the identity and location of the IPO law firm substantially 
affect the antitakeover charter provisions chosen by firms going public. Similarly, 
the identity of the law firm involved in a firm’s IPO and/or subsequent corporate 
affairs – and, in particular, whether the law firm is located in the firm’s state of 
location or elsewhere – might significantly affect the choice of incorporation state. 
An in-state law firm might be inclined to keep the firm in-state because such in-state 
incorporation would enable the law firm to handle fully the firm’s corporate affairs, 
avoiding the inconvenience and fees-sharing involved in having to use counsel from 
another state. Furthermore, in-state incorporation would provide the local law firm 
with an advantage over out-of-state law firms that might compete for the firm’s 
business, as the local law firm would be likely to have greater familiarity with the 
home state’s corporate law and better connections in the state (see Carney (1998)). 
Finally, before proceeding, it is worth noting another possible story that can be 
ruled up-front as inconsistent with the evidence already discussed. On this story, 
states tailor their corporate law to fit the type of firms located in them. Different 
types of firms have different needs and states might provide a corporate law system 
especially fitting for the type of firms most represented in the state. However, The 
regressions noted above, such as the one displayed in Table 6 for California, control 
for the firm’s industry and for various financial features of it. It is still the case that 
firms located outside California are on an order of magnitude less likely to 
incorporate in California than firms located on California that are in the same 
industry and have the same financial characteristics. Furthermore, under a story in 
which different states cater to different niches, one would expect that each of the 
state offering a product that is especially good for certain type of firms would attract 
a significant number of out-of-state incorporations from firms of this type. However, 
                                                 
9 Another implication of this story, whose testing is left for future work, is that firms operating 
in lines of business which depend more on the state (because their business is either more 
affected by the state’s regulation or by transactions with the state) would be more likely to 
remain in-state. Yet another implication is that the more concentrated are a company’s actual 
operations in its state of headquarters, the more likely the company to incorporate in this state.  
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when firms incorporate out-of-state, the great majority of them go the Delaware, 
which indicates that the heterogeneity among firms in their corporate law needs 
does not play a key role in this market. 
 
3.3.     Empirical Examination  
 
To examine the factors that make firms more likely to remain in-state, we ran 
two regressions in which the dependent variable was a dummy variable (In-state) 
that has a value of 1 if the firm remains in-state and 0 if it incorporates elsewhere. In 
the first regression, which is reported in Table 7, Column 1, the explanatory 
variables were only firm characteristics and state dummies used to control for state 
fixed effects. The firm characteristics included in this regression were the firm’s sales 
(log), the firm’s Tobin’s Q, the firm’s return on assets, the firm’s number of 
employees, the firm’s total equity, dummy variables indicating whether the firm 
went public in 1991-1995 or in 1996-2000, and industry dummies.   
In the second regression, whose results are reported in Column 2 of Table 7, we 
replaced the state dummies with various characteristics of the state in which the 
firm is located. In particular, we included:  
(i) State demographic characteristics -- the size of the state’s population (log), 
the number of local firms, and the per capita income;  
(ii) An interaction term of the size of the firm (as measured by the log of its 
sales) and the size of the state’s population (as measured by the log of the state’s 
population); 
(iii) The State’s regional location (northeast, south, mid-west, or west); 
(iv) A dummy variable indicating whether the state has adopted the RMBCA or 
the MBCA; and 
(v) Various legal and political characteristics of the state (which will be the 
focus of the analysis in Section 4 and which are listed in Table 10 to be discussed 
later on).10  
The results indicate that larger firms are less likely to remain in-state. The 
number of employees variable has in both regressions a coefficient that is negative 
and statistically significant (at 95% confidence). In the first regression, where log 
sales is included without the interaction term between it and the state size, it also 
has a negative and statistically significant coefficient (at 90% confidence). Because 
some of the extra transaction costs involved in out-of-state incorporation are fixed or 
                                                 
10 The regression reported in the second column of Table 7 is the same as the one reported in the 
first column of Table 10; each of these tables displays only the variables that are of interest for 
the discussion in the relevant Section of the paper.  
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at least do not grow proportionately with firm size, these costs have lower weight 
for large firms. This finding is thus consistent with the extra costs story. To the 
extent that large firms are more likely to use a national law firm, this finding might 
also be explained by the local lawyer story.  
The results in both regressions also indicate that newer firms are more likely (at 
99% confidence) to incorporate out-of-state. Firms going public in recent years 
might have been more likely to use out-of-state law firms, as the market for legal 
services has become more national. High-tech firms, which were substantially 
represented among firms going public in the 90’s, often had significant holdings by 
venture capitalists and financial intermediaries connected to legal advisers from 
national financial centers. Thus, this finding could point toward the local lawyers 
story.  
There is one result that is clearly consistent with the local favoritism factor and 
does not appear explainable by any of the other stories. As is indicated by the 
negative sign of the interaction term in the second regression, large firms are more 
likely (at 95% confidence) to incorporate in-state when their home state is small than 
when it is large. Large firms are more likely to be able to benefit from local 
favoritism in small states, where they can stand out and have significant clout, than 
in large states.  
In unreported regression, we use both sales and sales to the power of two as 
independent variables instead of log(sales). Consistent with the above finding, we 
obtain a negative coefficient on sales and a positive coefficient on sales to the power 
of two. This indicates that, even though large firms are more likely to incorporate 
out of state than small firms, this effect is weakened once we look at very large 
firms, which are the ones that have most clout and thus are most likely to benefit 
from local favoritism.   
Interestingly, the regional location of states appears to make a significant 
difference (we use the division into regions used by the US Census). In particular, 
firms located in the Northeast are more likely (at 99% confidence) to incorporate 
out-of-state. Firms located in the Northeast are more likely to use New York City 
lawyers engaged in national practice, and we suspect that such lawyers tend to use 
Delaware incorporations. The relevance of regional location might thus be due to 
the law firm factor.  
Both regressions indicate that adopting the RMBCA (or its close predecessor 
the MBCA) does not have a statistically significant effect on a state’s ability to retain 
firms. This enables us to reject the story that the presence of a large number of home 
state incorporations results from firms located in RMBCA states that prefer an  
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RMBCA statute and use staying at their home state as a tie-breaker among a large 
set of states with such a statute.  
 
3.4   Choosing to Incorporate in Delaware  
 
Thus far, we have examined which characteristics make firms more likely to 
incorporate out-of-state. It might be of interest to examine in particular which 
characteristics make firms more likely to incorporate in Delaware, the dominant 
jurisdiction used in out-of-state incorporations.  
Table 8 presents the results of a logit regression in which we regressed a 
dummy variable that has a value of 1 if the firm incorporated in Delaware and 0 
otherwise on the characteristics of firms used in earlier regressions. Not 
surprisingly, the factors that make firms more likely to be incorporated in Delaware 
are quite similar to those that make firms more likely to be incorporated out-of-state 
in general. Firms are more likely to incorporate in Delaware when they are large (at 
99% significance) and when they went public during the 90’s (again, at 99% 
significance).  
Interestingly, we do not find an association between Delaware incorporation 
and a higher Tobin’ Q. This association, which is reported by Daines (2001a) to hold 
for the 80’s and early 90’s, apparently does not hold in 1999.11  
Daines tried to infer from the association he found that Delaware’s law is better 
for shareholders. A problem of drawing such an inference even for the years in 
which the association existed is the likely presence of a selection effect; the selection 
of firms that have Delaware incorporation is far from random. The results reported 
in Table 8 indicate that the firm characteristics available from the Compustat 
database, which is the data used both by us and by Daines, can explain only a very 
small part of the selection of firms that incorporate in Delaware. There are clearly 
some omitted variables with respect to firms (such as, for example, the identity of 
the firm’s law firm) that have substantial influence on their incorporation choices. 
Identifying these omitted variables is an important task for future research. In the 
meantime, however, correlations between Delaware incorporation and shareholder 
                                                 
11 Subramanian (2002, fn 70) reports that his work-in-progress found that the correlation 
between Delaware incorporation and a higher Tobin’s Q largely disappears after 1996. Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and Ferrell (2002) point out that even during the 1981-1996 period studied by Daines, 
the correlation existed only in some years but not in others. They also argue that the fact that the 
correlation does not exist in some years, and that it comes and goes, indicates both that the 
correlation is not a general and persistent phenomenon and, furthermore, that its existence in 
some years is likely to result from a selection effect.   
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value cannot be used as a reliable basis for drawing inferences concerning the effect 
of Delaware law on shareholder value.12  
 
4     Antitakeover Protection and Incorporation Choices  
 
We have thus far examined what factors other than states’ corporate law 
systems affect incorporation choices. We now turn to examine the features of states’ 
corporate rules that influence these decisions and, in turn, how states fare in the 
market for incorporations.  
Prior empirical analysis has focused on examining the wealth effects of 
incorporating in Delaware versus incorporating elsewhere. Instead of focusing on 
differences between Delaware and all other states taken as a group, this paper 
unpacks the large group of states other than Delaware. As documented earlier, 
states vary considerably in their ability to retain in-state firms and to attract out-of-
state firms. These differences enable us to explore what factors make states more or 
less attractive for firms choosing a state of incorporation. To the extent that states 
seek to attract incorporations, such an analysis can identify what incentives 
competition provides to states. In particular, we will focus on using such an analysis 
to investigate how offering antitakeover statutes affects states’ attractiveness in the 
incorporation marketplace.  
 
4.1   Antitakeover Protections 
 
One of the most important and hotly debated subjects in corporate law has 
been the regulation of hostile takeovers. Unlike the British City Code, which bans all 
defensive tactics and facilitates takeover bids, most US states have developed a large 
body of antitakeover protections over the last twenty-five years. One primary source 
of antitakeover protections has been the adoption of state antitakeover statutes. 
Antitakeover protections have also been provided by the development in the 
Delaware courts (whose decisions were subsequently followed by courts in other 
states) of doctrines that permit managers to engage in defensive tactics and, in 
particular, to use poison pills.  
The body of academic opinion has largely viewed state takeover law as 
providing excessive protections against takeovers. Researchers who generally 
support state competition have been among those viewing state antitakeover 
statutes as excessive (see, e.g., Easterbrook and Fischel (1991), Romano (1993a, 
                                                 
12 See Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2002) for further discussion of this issue.  
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1993b)). The many scholars who believe that antitakeover statutes do not serve 
shareholders find support for their view in the empirical evidence on the effects of 
such statutes. The overwhelming majority of the event studies done on the adoption 
of state antitakeover statutes found either no price reactions or negative price 
reactions.13 Furthermore, researchers have also found evidence that state 
antitakeover statutes have operated to increase agency costs.14  
While researchers have generally taken the view that the antitakeover 
protections developed by state corporate law are largely excessive, they have 
differed on the role of state competition in this area. The proliferation of 
antitakeover statutes is consistent with the view that state competition provides 
adverse incentives with respect to issues, such as the level of antitakeover 
protections, that have a substantial effect on the private benefits of managers (see 
Bebchuk (1992), Bebchuk and Ferrell (1989, 2001) and Bar-Gill, Barzuza, and 
Bebchuk (2001)). However, the proliferation of state antitakeover statutes might 
present a problem for those holding the dominant view that state competition is 
generally beneficial. Supporters of this view have sought to reconcile it with their 
belief that state antitakeover statutes do not serve shareholders by arguing that state 
competition does not encourage, and is thus not responsible for, the adoption of 
antitakeover statutes (see, e.g., Easterbrook and Fischel (1991), Romano (1993a, 
2001)).  
On this view, amassing strong antitakeover statutes is likely to decrease rather 
than increase the number of incorporations. Most of these statutes were still 
adopted, so the argument goes, because the adopting states could not resist the 
lobbying or political pressure of some managers concerned about the threat of a 
takeover. As Winter (1993, at xi) puts it: “The problem [with antitakeover statutes] is 
not that states compete for charters but that too often they do not.” Thus, on this 
view, state competition has operated not to encourage the adoption of antitakeover 
statutes but rather to discourage and moderate it. 
In support of this view, supporters of state competition have argued that 
Delaware, the most successful state, has adopted fewer and milder antitakeover 
statutes, especially compared with states such as Pennsylvania, Ohio, and 
Massachusetts (see, e.g., Romano (2001)). It is far from clear, however, that Delaware 
offers less antitakeover protection than most states. Although there are states that 
                                                 
13 See, e.g., Karpoff and Malatesta (1989). For surveys of these many studies, see Romano 
(1993a) and Gartman (2000).  
14 Bertrand and Mullinathan (1998) found that the adoption of state antitakeover statutes 
resulted in increased extraction of rents through executive compensation. Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (1999) found that the adoption of antitakeover statutes reduced managers’ 
incentives to minimize labor costs.     
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have more antitakeover statutes than Delaware, there are also states that have no 
antitakeover statutes. Furthermore, unlike other states, Delaware has a very large 
and developed body of case law on takeovers, which makes the absence of some 
statutes practically irrelevant. For example, because Delaware has a large body of 
judge-made law upholding the indefinite use of poison pills, the absence in 
Delaware of some state antitakeover statutes, such as a statute endorsing poison 
pills, is practically irrelevant.15  
In contrast, the adoption of state antitakeover statutes did have practical 
significance in other states. No state other than Delaware has a developed case law 
on defensive tactics. Indeed, a Lexis search indicates that most states do not have 
even a single case on poison pills. In these states, the adoption of pill endorsement 
statutes and constituency statutes provided managers with the confidence, 
notwithstanding the absence of precedents in these states thus far, that indefinite 
use of poison pill would be permitted. In some states (e.g., New Jersey), the 
adoption of a pill endorsement statute served to override an earlier case ruling 
against the validity of poison pills. The adoption of antitakeover statutes by a state 
without a developed takeover case law, especially the adoption of several types of 
statutes, might have conveyed a message that the state’s corporate law is committed 
to providing substantial protections from takeovers, a message which in Delaware 
was in large part supplied by case law.  
Thus, in examining the question whether competition rewards stronger 
antitakeover protections, little can be learnt from observing that Delaware has fewer 
antitakeover statutes than some states – both because other states vary considerably 
in this regard and because Delaware’s takeover law is in large part provided by its 
developed case law. We therefore propose to approach this question by unpacking 
the group of all states other than Delaware and studying the cross-state differences 
within this group. The position taken by supporters of state competition implies that 
states adopting more antitakeover statutes would not do better, and indeed would 





                                                 
15 As long as the pill is in place, any additional defense is superfluous, as the pill by itself 
completely blocks a bidder from proceeding. And if a bidder overcomes the pill by taking 
control of the board in a proxy contest, a control share acquisition statute and fair price statute, 
which are generally applicable only to offers the board does not approve, would be irrelevant as 
well.     
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4.2   Standard Antitakeover Statutes 
 
Table 9, taken from Gartman (2000), indicates the antitakeover statutes that 
each state has. The first six columns stand for “standard” types of antitakeover 
statutes. We define the following dummy variables:  
       (1)  Control  share: equal to 1 if the state has a control share acquisition 
statute and to 0 otherwise; 16 
       (2)  Fair  price: equal to 1 if the state has a fair price statute and to 0 
otherwise; 17 
       (3)  NoFreezeouts  (1-3), which is equal to 1 if the state has a business 
combination statute that prevents a freezeout for up to three years after a takeover 
and to 0 otherwise; 18 
       (4)  NoFreezouts  (4-5), which is equal to 1 if the state has a business 
combination statute that prevents a freezeout for a period longer than three years 
after a takeover (the longest period adopted by some states is 5 years) and to 0 
otherwise; 
       (5) Poison Pill Endorsement, which is equal to 1 if the state has a statute 
endorsing the use of a poison pill and to 0 otherwise; 19 and  
       (6) Constituencies, which is equal to 1 if the state has a statute allowing 
managers to take into account interests of non-shareholders in defending against a 
takeover and to 0 otherwise. 20  
                                                 
16 A control share acquisition statute essentially requires a hostile bidder to put its offer to a vote 
of the shareholders before proceeding with it. If a bidder does not do so and purchases a large 
block of shares, it runs a very serious risk of not being able to vote these shares at all and thus 
not be able to gain control despite its large holdings.  
17 A fair price statute requires a bidder that succeeds in gaining control and then proceeds with 
a second-step freezeout (a transaction removing remaining shareholders) to pay the remaining 
minority shareholders the same price as it paid for shares acquired through its bid. This 
prevents bidders from using the threat of a second-step freezeout at a low price as a mechanism 
for pressuring the shareholders into tendering.  
18 Business combination statutes prevent a bidder that gains control from merging the target 
with its own assets for a specified period of time (unless certain difficult-to-meet conditions are 
satisfied). Such a constraint might make it more difficult for successful bidders to realize gains 
from synergy following a takeover and this, by reducing the potential profits from a takeover, 
might discourage potential buyers from bidding.  
19 Poison pills are warrants or rights issued by the company which are triggered and entitle 
their holders to get significant value in the event that any buyer obtains a significant block 
without the approval of the board. As long as they are not redeemed, poison pills make a 
takeover prohibitively costly. Delaware courts have approved the use of pills in a series of well-
known cases, starting with Moran vs. Household International in 1985. Other states have found 
it necessary to ground the use of poison pills in legislation either because of the absence of such 
cases or in a few instances to reverse court rulings against poison pills.   
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Altogether, control share acquisition statutes were passed in 27 states, fair price 
statutes in 27 states, business combination statutes (of both types) in 33 states, pill 
endorsement statutes in 25 states, and constituencies statutes in 31 states. Of these 
143 statutes, 135 statutes were adopted in the period 1985-1991.21 
As noted above, antitakeover statutes are possibly important not only in what 
they actually do but also in what they signal. They send an antitakeover message 
and signal that the state is likely to provide in the future antitakeover protections 
that will be valuable for firms. Therefore, how many statutes have been adopted by 
a given state might be important. Adopting the full arsenal of standard antitakeover 
statutes sends a clear antitakeover message to state courts and to potential and 
existing incorporators. We therefore will use, as an alternative to using dummies for 
each of the statutes, an antitakeover protection index (using a similar approach to 
that LaPorta et. al. (1998) used to study cross-country differences in shareholder 
protection).  
Our antitakeover protection index, INDEX, attaches to each state a score from 0 
to 5 that is equal to the number of standard antitakeover statutes that it has. 
(Because each state can have either a freezeout statute with up to 3 years 
moratorium or one with a 4- or 5-year moratorium (but of course not both), the 
maximum number of standard antitakeover statutes that a state can adopt is 5.) We 
also run a regression in which we seek to avoid imposing linearity on the effects of 
any given increase in the index score, and to this end we define five dummy 
variables – INDEX1, INDEX2, INDEX3, INDEX4, INDEX5 – each representing the 
set of states with the relevant number of statutes.  
 
4.3   Extreme Statutes 
 
In addition to the standard statutes, there are three “notorious” states that 
adopted unusual and more restrictive statutes. Pennsylvania and Ohio adopted 
statutes that enable the “disgorgement” or “recapture” of all the short-term profits 
made by a hostile acquirer, thus discouraging potential hostile bidders. 
Massachusetts adopted a statute that mandated a staggered board, which has a 
                                                                                                                                                             
20 Such statutes are regarded as antitakeover statutes because allowing the managers to take into 
account how a takeover would affect, say, employees or debtholders provides managers with 
extra reasons for opposing the takeover and makes it more difficult for courts to scrutinize such 
decisions.  
21 Two statutes were adopted earlier and six statutes were adopted in 1997-99. We ran all our 
regressions excluding the six statutes adopted in 97-99 and obtained similar results.   
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strong antitakeover force,22 even for firms that did not have a provision to this effect 
in their charter.  
These two types of statutes and these three states have earned the universal 
scorn of commentators. Commentators have generally regarded these statutes as 
especially excessive and detrimental to shareholders. Indeed, several event studies 
found that the statutes passed by these three states had a substantial negative effect 
– higher than the effects found for the passage of other antitakeover statutes – on the 
stock value of firms incorporated in these states.23   
Supporters of state competition have used these three states to support their 
position that state competition rewards moderation in the provision of antitakeover 
protections. For example, Daines (2001a) and Romano (1993a, 1993b, 2001) use 
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and/or Massachusetts as prime examples for their view that 
Delaware’s law is relatively hospitable to takeovers.  
Supporters of state competition have also directed some of their empirical work 
to these three states. Daines (2001a) reports that firms in these three states have a 
lower Tobin’s Q. Note, however, that this finding is at most an indication that the 
statutes hurt shareholder wealth, consistent with the findings of the event studies. 
This finding however, does not at all indicate that the statutes discouraged 
incorporations in these states and hurt the states adopting them in the incorporation 
market.  
Romano (1993) reports that most Pennsylvania firms opted out of the 
Pennsylvania statute, and she views this opting out as an indication that state 
competition works well. On her view, the opting out indicates that the adoption of 
the statute was not welcome to managers. Such a conclusion, however, cannot be 
drawn from this finding. Because the opt-out procedure was rather simple, the 
managers of Pennsylvania firms that chose to opt out of the statute were hardly hurt 
by its passage. In contrast, the adoption of the statute could have benefited 
considerably those managers that did not opt out of it and who obtained 
antitakeover protections that they could not have obtained otherwise. Thus, 
managers who opted out of the statute were largely indifferent to its adoption, but 
                                                 
22 Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian (2002) analyze the special antitakeover power of 
staggered boards and present evidence that staggered boards indeed have such an effect. 
Staggered boards are shown to increase substantially the likelihood that a target receiving a 
hostile bid would remain independent.  
23 Szewczyk and Tsetsekos (1992), Karpoff and Malatesta (1990), and Swartz (1996) all found 
that passage of the Pennsylvania statute was accompanied by a substantial reduction in the 
value of Pennsylvania firms. Ryngaert and Netter (1990) reached a similar conclusion with 
respect to the passage of the Ohio legislation. Finally, Daines (2001b) obtained similar findings 
with respect to the passage of the Massachusetts legislation.   
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managers who did not opt out of it might well have viewed its adoption quite 
favorably. The substantial incidence of opting out does not therefore imply that the 
passage of the statute was viewed by the managers of Pennsylvania firms as a 
negative development. In any event, the opting out by firms that remained 
incorporated in Pennsylvania in no way indicates that this state has been hurt in the 
incorporation market.  
Surprisingly, supporters of state competition have not tried to test directly 
whether the actions of Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Massachusetts have substantially 
hurt these states in the incorporation market. To explore this question, we defined 
two additional dummy variables:  
(i) Recapture, which is equal to 1 if the state has a statute enabling the recapture 
of profits and to 0 otherwise;24 and 
(ii) Staggered, which is equal to 1 if the state has a statute imposing staggered 
boards and to 0 otherwise.25  
  Recapture is essentially a dummy variable standing for Pennsylvania or Ohio 
and Staggered is essentially a dummy variable standing for Massachusetts.  
 
4.4    What Helps States Retain In-State Firms?  
 
(1) A First Look: Looking at the summary statistics in Table 5, we observe that 
states without antitakeover statutes seem to be doing poorly in terms of the fraction 
of their local firms that they are able to retain. Whereas 38% of all firms remain in-
state, most of the states with no antitakeover statutes retain a much lower fraction; 
California, for example, retains only 22% of the firms located in it. Observe also that 
states that have all the standard antitakeover statutes generally retain a larger-than-
average fraction of their in-state firms. For example, Indiana and Wisconsin, each of 
which offers a “royal flush” set of five standard antitakeover statutes, retain 70% 
and 72% respectively of the firms located in them. More generally, the fraction of 
local firms that each state retains is correlated with the number of antitakeover 
statutes that the state has. 
The summary statistics in Table 5 also do not display any apparent strong 
adverse effect on the three states adopting extreme statutes. We observe that 
                                                 
24 Recapture statutes prevent bidders that gained control from making any short-term profits by 
requiring that such profits be given to the acquired company.  
25 The staggered board statute adopted by Massachusetts changed the default: instead of 
allowing a staggered board only if the company opts into such an arrangement, the statute 
imposes such an arrangement unless the company opted out of it, and the opting out 
requirements were ones that were difficult to obtain for the shareholders of existing 
Massachusetts firms.   
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Pennsylvania and Ohio, which have the notorious disgorgement statute, retain a 
larger-than-average fraction of their local firms, and that the third “misbehaving” 
state, Massachusetts, retains a lower-than-average fraction of its local firms. 
We ran the following (unreported) regression on the set of all states other than 
Delaware with 10 or more firms located in them.26 We regressed the fraction of local 
firms that each state succeeds in retaining in-state on the number of standard 
antitakeover statutes that the state has, on dummy variables indicating whether the 
state has one of the two types of extreme statutes, and on all the demographic and 
other characteristics of the state used in the regression reported in Table 7. The 
results indicate that increasing the number of antitakeover statutes increases (at 95% 
significance) the fraction of local firms that incorporate in-state.  
Not to assume that increasing the number of antitakeover statutes has a linear 
effect, we also ran the above regression using instead of the number of statutes five 
dummy variables indicating whether the state has 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 antitakeover 
statutes respectively. The results indicate that having three, four, or five 
antitakeover statutes increases (also at 95% confidence) the fraction of local firms 
retained. Compared with having no antitakeover statutes, having all five standard 
antitakeover statutes increases the fraction of local firms retained by 0.26, a very 
large increase indeed.     
 (2) Taking Firm Characteristics into Account: The above regressions do not 
control for the possibility that states might vary in the characteristics of the firms 
located in them. To address this concern, we conducted a test controlling for firm 
characteristics. We regressed on the set of all firms a dummy variable that is equal to 
1 if the firm incorporates in its home state and to 0 otherwise on:  
(i) The antitakeover protections that are offered by the state, as described 
below; 
(ii) A dummy variable indicating whether the state has adopted the RMBCA/ 
MBCA;  
(iii) The percentage of the voters choosing the Democratic candidate in the 2000 
election; 
(iv) All the characteristics of firms (including industry dummies) and 
demographic and regional characteristics of states examined in Section 3 (see Table 
7, second column).  
With respect to (i), the antitakeover protection, we used three different 
specifications for states’ antitakeover protections. We accordingly ran three 
regressions whose results are all reported in Table 10. The regression reported in 
Column 1 of Table 10 uses the score of each state in the antitakeover protection 
                                                 
26 Only Arkansas, Montana, and North Dakota have less than 10 firms each.   
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index to stand for the state’s antitakeover protection. The regression reported on 
Column 2 also relies on the index but, in order not to impose linearity on the 
influence of the index, uses five dummy variables representing the groups of states 
with index levels of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. The regression reported in Column 3 uses 
dummy variables for each of the standard antitakeover statutes. All three 
regressions use dummy variables for the extreme statutes, the recapture 
(disgorgement) statute present in Pennsylvania and Ohio and the staggered boards 
statute present in Massachusetts.  
All the three regressions control for all the characteristics of firms and 
characteristics of states discussed in connection with Table 7. The coefficients of 
these characteristics are already reported in Table 7; we therefore do not report them 
again in Table 10 in order to focus on the parameters of interest in this section. It is 
also worth noting that, for robustness check, we have run the three regressions with 
respect only to the firms that went public during 1996-2000, and we obtained similar 
results to the ones obtained for the set of all firms that we now turn to discuss.  
(3) Standard Antitakeover Statutes: All the regressions reported in Table 10 
indicate that standard antitakeover statutes make a state more likely to retain local 
firms. The first regression indicates that having a higher score on the antitakeover 
index increases the fraction of retained firms (at 99% confidence). The second 
regression, which uses dummies for each of the index levels, indicates that having 3 
or more statutes is especially helpful for retaining in-state firms (at 99% 
significance). The third regression, using separate dummies for different standard 
statutes, indicates that the statutes that are most helpful to have (all at 99% 
confidence) are a control share acquisition statute, a business combination statute 
with a long (4-5 years) moratorium period, and a pill endorsement statute.  
Calculating the marginal effects from the logit regressions, we found that the 
effect of antitakeover statutes is not only highly significant but also substantial in 
magnitude. To provide a sense of the magnitude of the identified effects, we derived 
two estimates using the results of the regression on the antitakeover index reported 
in Column 1. First, we have derived prediction for the choices that all the firms 
located in the 8 states that currently have no antitakeover protection would have 
made had their states adopted all five standard antitakeover statutes. This provided 
us with an estimate that, if these 8 states had adopted all five antitakeover statutes, 
the percentages of these firms that remain in-state would have more than doubled – 
increasing from the current level of 23% to 50%.  
Conversely, we estimated in the same way what would have happened if the 9 
states that currently have five standard antitakeover statutes had not adopted such 
statutes. To this end, we used our regression to predict how the change would have  
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affects the choices of all the firms located in these 9 states. This provided us with an 
estimate that, without the antitakeover statutes, these 9 states would have lost more 
than half of the firms currently located in them, with the percentage of firms’ 
remaining in-state declining from the current level of 49% of all local firms to 23%. 
(4) Extreme Statutes: In all three regressions reported in Table 10, having a 
recapture statute has a positive but not statistically significant effect on states’ 
attractiveness for their in-state firms. Thus, as far as retaining local firms is 
concerned, the evidence does not support the belief that adopting a recapture statute 
has hurt Pennsylvania and Ohio in the incorporation market. To be sure, some local 
firms opted out of the adopted statute according to the findings reported by 
Romano (1993b). There is no evidence, however, that the adoption of the statute has 
led firms located in Pennsylvania and Ohio to incorporate elsewhere, which is the 
critical test for determining success in the market for incorporations.  
As to the staggered board statute, the results are mixed. A staggered board 
statute helps in retaining firms (at 99% confidence) in two regressions but has a 
negative effect (at 90% confidence). The results for both the staggered boards statute 
and the recapture statute are the same when the regressions are run only on the 
firms that went public during 1996-2000. 
Whereas our results that amassing standard antitakeover statutes helps states 
attract local firms are generally consistent with those of Subramanian (2002), he 
concludes that the recapture and staggered boards statutes have hurt the ability of 
the states adopting them to retain firms. However, he uses one dummy variable to 
stand for the presence of either a recapture or a staggered board statute, and he 
controls only for firm characteristics but not for state characteristics other than their 
antitakeover statutes. When we ran the same regressions as he did, we obtained 
similar results to his. However, in order to allow for the possibility that the 
incorporation market did not treat recapture and staggered boards statutes in the 
same way, we used a separate dummy variable for each of these statutes. With this 
specification, the recapture statute was no longer found to hurt the states adopting it 
even without introducing state characteristics. And once we controlled for state 
demographic and regional characteristics, the staggered board statute no longer had 
a negative effect on the state adopting it.  
We should caution, however, against drawing from our findings any firm 
conclusions with respect to the effects of the adoption of extreme statutes. The 
dummy for recapture statute is essentially a dummy for Pennsylvania and Ohio, 
and the staggered board dummy is essentially a dummy for Massachusetts, and 
these three states might have some other special features. It would be fair to say, 
however, that the existing evidence does not enable accepting the belief of  
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supporters of state competition that adopting extreme antitakeover statutes is 
penalized in the incorporation market.  
(5) Liberal Political culture: It is interesting to note that, in all three regressions, 
states that are strongly Democratic are less successful (at 99% confidence) in 
retaining local firms. For any given set of statutory corporate provisions, judges in 
states that are strongly Democratic might be expected to be more willing to 
intervene, which might be unattractive to those making incorporation decisions.27 
 
4.5   What Makes States Attractive for Out-of-State Firms? 
 
We now turn to examine what makes states other than Delaware more or less 
attractive to out-of-state incorporations. Looking first at the summary statistics in 
Table 5, we find that, out of the 10 states with more than 15 out-of-state 
incorporations each, 8 states have four or five antitakeover statutes.  
To examine this issue more systematically, we ran the regressions reported in 
Table 11. In these regressions, the dependent variable is log of (1 + the number of 
out-of-state incorporations) for all states other than Delaware.28 For the covariants 
we used the same firm characteristics and the same state characteristics (including 
the alternative specifications of antitakeover protections) that we used in the earlier 
regressions reported in Tables 10.  
Starting with state demographic characteristics, a higher per capita income 
helps attracting out-of-state incorporations (at 99% confidence in all three 
regressions). It might be that, once firms go out-of-state, they prefer a state with a 
relatively developed legal infrastructure, whose presence might be correlated with a 
higher per capita income. 
The ideological leaning toward Democrats does not have any statistically 
significant role. It might be that, once a firm goes out-of-state, it will tend to choose a 
state with certain clear positions on corporate law issues, and those positions will 
make the general ideological leaning of the state less significant.  
Turning to antitakeover protection, the results clearly indicate that offering a 
stronger antitakeover protection is also helpful in attracting out-of-state 
incorporations. The first regression (Column 1) indicates that having a higher score 
on the antitakeover index makes a state more attractive (at 99% confidence) to out-
of-state incorporations. The second regression (Column 2), which uses dummies for 
                                                 
27 Different observers might interpret this link in different ways. The desire to avoid judicial 
intervention might be rooted in shareholder value considerations (a positive interpretation) or 
in agency problems (a negative interpretation). 
28 Having the dependent variable be equal to the number of out-of-state incorporations yields 
similar results.  
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each of the score levels, also finds such a link. Finally, the third regression (Column 
3) indicates that the statutes most helpful to attracting out-of-state incorporations 
are a control share acquisition statute and a pill endorsement statute (at 95% 
confidence and 90% confidence respectively); business combinations statutes, which 
were the third type of statute that we identified as helpful for retaining in-state 
firms, are not statistically significant in attracting out-of-state incorporations.  
Finally, as to the two types of extreme statutes, in all three regressions, both a 
staggered board statute and a recapture statute do not have a statistically significant 
effect on states’ ability to attract out-of-state incorporations. The evidence, again, 
does not enable concluding that the incorporation market penalizes states adopting 
such statutes.   
 
4.6  The Overall Effects of Corporate Migration  
   on Antitakeover Protections 
 
We finally turn to examine the overall effect of the migration of firms from their 
states of location to states other than Delaware on the takeover rules governing 
them. Does this migration overall operate to increase antitakeover protections?  
To study this question, let us first look at some summary statistics. Table 12A 
displays, for each level of the antitakeover index, (i) how many of the migrating 
firms had this index level at the home state that they left, and (ii) how many of the 
migrating firms had this index level at their state of incorporation. The table 
indicates that most migrating firms either strengthened or retained their level of 
antitakeover protections. 60% of the migrating firms moved to a state that have 
more antitakeover statutes than the state where they are located. Furthermore, 
whereas 23% of the firms move to a state that has the same number of antitakeover 
statutes, 87% of these cases are of firms whose state of location already had 4 or 5 
statutes.  
Table 12B reports results on the distribution of changes caused by migration. 
Within the group of firms not located or incorporated in Delaware, the migration of 
firms to out-of-state incorporation increases (at 95% confidence) the level of the 
antitakeover index that governs these firms. Furthermore, for each of the standard 
antitakeover statutes, this migration increases (at 95% confidence) the likelihood 
that any given migrating firm will be governed by such a statute. Thus, this 
migration operates unambiguously to increase the overall levels of antitakeover 




5     Delaware’s Dominance of the Market  
 
We now turn to explore the incorporation market’s structure and Delaware’s 
dominance of it. In most markets where a firm has market power, a major concern is 
that this firm would reduce output to raise prices. In contrast, in the market for 
corporate law that we study, output reduction is not a problem. However, assessing 
the strength of competition is in this market is still quite important for 
understanding how it operates and how the dominant player in it makes quality 
and price choices.  
Let us look back at Table 2, which displays Delaware’s market share. Delaware 
has incorporations of 58% of all firms and 59% of the incorporations of Fortune 500 
firms. This division of the market represents a substantial market concentration. 
Using the Herfindahl index (see Tirole (1988, at 221), Hovenkamp (1999, at 512-16)), 
we calculate that its value is 3,435 in the market for incorporations and 3,638 in the 
market for incorporations of Fortune 500 firms.29  
The above paragraph has considered Delaware’s market share among all 
incorporations or Fortune 500 incorporations, which is how Delaware’s dominant 
position is commonly measured (see e.g, Gartman (2000)).30 Although the numbers 
reported in the preceding paragraph already indicate a large degree of market 
concentration, they do not provide the full picture concerning Delaware’s market 
power.  
To start with, it is useful to consider not only Delaware’s fraction of the total 
incorporation market but also its fraction of out-of-state incorporations. As we have 
seen, many firms’ choices display a home-state advantage. There is no reason to 
think that all of these firms are exactly on the fence – that is, that they prefer to 
incorporate in their home state rather than in Delaware by only a very small margin. 
A state that marginally improved on Delaware’s product could hope to capture fully 
the market for out-of-state incorporations; in contrast, such a state could not hope to 
attract those firms that currently prefer in a significant way in-state incorporation 
over Delaware incorporation. Thus, in assessing Delaware’s position, it is useful to 
consider not only Delaware’s share of all incorporations but also its share of all out-
of-state incorporations.  
                                                 
29 According to the 1992 Justice Department guidelines, for example, mergers may be examined 
for possible challenge if the post-merger Herfindahl index is above 1000 (see Hovenkamp 
(1999), at 516). 
30 See also the web site of the Delaware Division of Corporations, www.state.de.us/corp, which 
indicates that about 50% of all public corporations and 60% of the Fortune 500 are incorporated 
in Delaware.  
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Table 13 displays the division of the market for out-of-state incorporations. 
Delaware has 85% of total out-of-state incorporations, 83% of the out-of-state 
incorporations of Fortune 500 firms, and 90% of the incorporations of firms that 
went public in 1996-2000. The concentration of the market for out-of-state 
incorporations is very large. We calculate that the Herfindahl index has a value of 
7,287 in the market for all out-of-state incorporations and a value of 8,159 in the 
market of out-of-state incorporations of firms that went public in recent years.  
Furthermore, it is important to examine not only Delaware’s current shares of 
total incorporations and total out-of-state incorporations, but also to consider how 
these shares have been evolving over time. Table 14 divides all the firms not located 
in Delaware (almost all firms) into three groups: those firms that went public before 
1991, those that went public during 1991-1995, and those that went public during 
1996-2000.  
The results of the regressions reported in Table 7 indicate that firms that went 
public in the past decade are more likely to be incorporated out-of-state. Consistent 
with this result, Column 1 of Table 14 shows that the percentage of firms 
incorporating out-of-state is higher for more recent cohorts: this percentage is 50% 
for firms that went public before 1991, 59% for firms that went public during 1991-
1995, and 67.5% for firms that went public in 1995-2000.  
Column 2 of Table 14 indicates that Delaware captures the lion’s share of out-
of-state incorporations for firms of different vintages and, furthermore, that its share 
has been trending upwards in the past decade. Delaware captures 80% of all of out-
of-state incorporations by firms that went public before 1991, 88% of all such 
incorporations by firms that went public during 1991-1995, and 90% of all such 
incorporations by firms that went public during 1996-2000.  
Both factors – the higher fraction of out-of-state incorporations in recent cohorts 
and Delaware’s higher share of out-of-state incorporations in recent cohorts – 
combine to make Delaware’s share of total incorporations higher for firms from 
recent cohorts. As Column 3 of Table 14 indicates, Delaware captures only 62% of 
the incorporations of firms that went public before 1991, 67% of the incorporations 
of firms that went public during 1991-1995, and 75% of the incorporations of firms 
that went public during 1996-2000. This implies that, if Delaware simply maintains 
with respect to firms going public in the future its performance with recent cohorts, 
its total share of incorporations can be expected to climb in the future, as new firms 
enter the market and old ones leave it in one way or another.   
The very substantial concentration in the market for corporate law does not by 
itself imply that Delaware has a market p o w e r  t h a t  i t  c a n  u s e  t o  m a k e  s u p r a -
competitive returns. Even a seller that has a market share close or equal to 1 would  
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have little ability to make supra-competitive profits if the market were perfectly 
contestable and any attempt to make such profits could be expected to immediately 
trigger a challenge by a new entrant. 
In the case of the market for corporate law, however, there are reasons to 
believe that the market is far from perfectly contestable. Delaware makes, and has 
long made, substantial supra-competitive profits that far exceed the state’s expenses 
on the firms incorporated in it (see Kahan and Kamar (2001)). Delaware’s franchise 
tax revenues in 2001 are about $600 million, constitute a substantial fraction of the 
state’s annual budget, and amount to $3,000 for each household of four. 
Furthermore, Delaware derives additional benefits from the substantial profits made 
(and taxes paid) by its relatively large legal services sector.  
The presence of such supra-competitive returns, and their persistence over 
time, indicate the likely presence of some substantial barriers to entry. The 
incumbent in this market might obtain advantages from the presence of network 
externalities (see Klausner (1995), Kahan and Kamar (1997)), from Delaware’s sunk 
investments in legal infrastructure (such as a specialized and effective court system 
– see Romano (1985), Black (1990), Fisch (2001)), or from the incumbent’s ability to 
match and out-do any serious attempt to unseat it (see Bebchuk and Ferrell (2001)). 
Bar-Gill, Barzuza, and Bebchuk (2001) develop of formal model of some of the 
factors that might provide Delaware with market power and enable it to make 
supra-competitive returns. Bebchuk and Hamdani (2002) attempt to provide a full 
analysis of these factors.  
As already emphasized, Delaware’s market power and dominance does not 
give rise to the traditional concerns associated with monopoly power in other 
markets, that is, the deadweight loss due to output reduction. Rather, it is relevant 
for a better analysis of Delaware’s behavior and its choices with respect to the 
design and pricing of its product. Researchers have already examined how 
Delaware’s dominance might lead it to make its law more unpredictable and 
litigation-intensive (Kamar (1998), Kahan and Kamar (2001)), to engage in price-
discrimination (Kahan and Kamar (2001)), and to seek to discourage challenges to its 
dominance by charging firms less than the value to them of Delaware’s network and 
institutional advantages (Bar-Gill, Barzuza, and Bebchuk (2001)). The analysis in this 
section suggests that more work in this direction would be worthwhile.  
 
6     Concluding Remarks  
 
This paper has taken a different approach to the empirical study of state 
competition than prior work. Whereas prior work has focused on the wealth effects  
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of Delaware incorporation, taking incorporation decisions as exogenous, this paper 
has focused on investigating the factors that influence and explain incorporation 
decisions. Furthermore, whereas prior work has largely put all states other than 
Delaware in one group, this paper has used cross-state differences to identify what 
makes states more and less successful in attracting incorporations.  
The evidence indicates that a significant home-state advantage is at work in the 
market for corporate law. In contrast to the conventional picture of state 
competition, firms’ incorporation choices are not solely based on comparing states’ 
corporate law systems but are significantly influenced by the firm’s location. States 
are substantially more successful in “selling” their corporate laws to firms located in 
them than to firms headquartered elsewhere. This home-state advantage is 
especially strong with respect to smaller and older firms, a pattern consistent with 
several explanations for the presence of such advantage. The evidence is consistent, 
we have found, with firms induced to remain in-state by the desire to save costs, by 
the hope to benefit from local favoritism, or by the influence of local counsel. The 
evidence is inconsistent, however, with the possibility that the home-state 
advantage is a product of the widespread adoption of the RMBCA or of states’ 
tailoring their corporate law system to the type of firms located in them.  
Although all states have some success in retaining firms located in them, and 
although none of the other states comes even close to Delaware in terms of 
attracting out-of-state incorporations, states greatly differ in how they fare in the 
incorporation market. We have used cross-state differences to study the legal and 
other features of states that make them attractive to incorporating firms. Among 
other things, we have found that states that have a heavily Democratic electorate, 
and thus are more likely to have activist judges, are less successful in attracting 
firms. States that have adopted the Revised Model Business Corporations Act or its 
predecessor are not more successful in attracting incorporations. Demographic 
characteristics and location of the state also play a role.   
Addressing the long-standing debate on whether state competition has 
encouraged the proliferation of antitakeover statutes, we have found that amassing 
antitakeover statutes makes states more successful in the incorporation market -- 
both in retaining in-state firms and in attracting out-of-state incorporations. States 
that offer all or most of the standard antitakeover statutes do especially well, and 
states that offer no such statutes do especially poorly. Our estimates of the identified 
effect of antitakeover statutes indicate that it is quite large in magnitude.  
Indeed, in contrast to the beliefs of supporters of state competition, the 
evidence does not indicate that the incorporation market has penalized even those 
three states that passed statutes universally regarded as detrimental to shareholders.  
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These statutes thus did not bring the states adopting them to the point where 
antitakeover protections drive away firms. Because these statutes did not help the 
adopting states attract more firms, however, this point might not be far away from 
the one reached by these states.  
Our findings on antitakeover protection and state competition call for 
reconsidering a widely held view that is both negative on antitakeover statutes and 
positive on state competition. Those who hold this view should revisit at least one of 
the elements of their position. At this stage, researchers that held this view can 
reasonably take different positions on how it should  be revised in light of our 
findings.31 What is important, however, is that the established link between state 
antitakeover statutes and incorporations be taken into account in subsequent 
analysis of state competition and takeover law.  
Delaware’s market dominance, we have shown, is even greater than has been 
previously recognized. The fraction of firms going out of state has been steadily 
increasing, and Delaware’s dominance of the market for out-of-state incorporations 
has also been increasing. Both factors have made Delaware’s share of total 
incorporations among recent corporate cohorts substantially greater than in the pool 
of all incorporations. Thus, even if Delaware merely maintains for future cohorts its 
performance for recent cohorts, Delaware’s share of total incorporations is expected 
to increase substantially over time. The levels of concentration in the market for 
corporate law, combined with the substantial profits consistently made by 
Delaware, suggest that the market is best analyzed as one with a monopoly seller 
and significant barriers to entry. Subsequent work on the market for corporate law 
should investigate how these features of the market affect the decisions of the 
dominant player and other market participants.  
Our analysis can provide both basis and questions for subsequent empirical 
work. Much more work can be done on the factors that pull firms to remain in-state. 
Also, our approach for studying how incorporation choices are affected by cross-
state differences can be used with respect to other features of corporate law that 
vary across states. Future work could examine how incorporation choices are 
                                                 
31 Our own view is that some state antitakeover statutes are likely beneficial or neutral. Control 
share acquisition statutes, for example, can address the problem of pressure to tender and 
facilitate undistorted shareholder choice (Bebchuk and Hart (2001), Bebchuk (2002)). However, 
poison pills can produce excessive protection from takeovers when they are coupled with 
staggered boards (Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian (2002)). As a result, the wide latitude 
granted to managers to use poison pills by poison pill endorsement statutes and stakeholder 
statutes is likely to produce excessive protection in many cases. Thus, our view is that, although 
some antitakeover statutes are beneficial or neutral, others are not, and that the incorporation 
market provides states with excessive incentives to restrict takeovers.  
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affected by elements of corporate law other than those on which we have focused. 
Such work could help complete the picture with respect to the determinants of 
firms’ incorporation decisions and, in turn, with respect to the incentives that state 
competition provides. 
Finally, whereas our work has taken as given the existing differences in 
takeover law among states, it would be worthwhile to investigate what explains 
these differences – an inquiry of the supply side of the market. Given that amassing 
antitakeover statutes helps attract incorporations, why don’t all states amass such 
statutes? The reason, at least in part, is presumably that not all states focus on the 
goal of maximizing the number of incorporations.32 Although the conventional 
assumption in the literature on state competition is that all states are guided by this 
goal, the findings of this paper indicate that this is clearly not the case; after all, 
many states do not take some easy steps (i.e., adopt more antitakeover statutes) that 
would likely increase the number of incorporations these states attract. Exploring 
what makes some states focus on attracting incorporations but not others, as well as 
what differences among states produce their varied decisions on antitakeover 
statutes, is  an important question for future research.  
 
                                                 
32 Some states (especially large states) might not care about how many firms incorporate in 
them, and some states might have preferences about the substantive content of its corporate law 
and not only in how this law would affect incorporations. (New York or California, for example, 
might have among their citizens a significant fraction of the shareholders of many public firms.) 
Cumming and MacIntosh (2001) suggest that, in the Canadian market for corporate law, the 
behavior of provinces is inconsistent with the view that they seek to maximize the number of 
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TABLE  1 
 
The Distribution of Firms’ Locations among States  
 
   All publicly traded       Fortune 500             Firms going 
















state  Percentage 
CA 1,254 19.20%  CA  41  11.08%  CA  549  27.31% 
TX 586 8.97%  TX  36  9.73%  TX  172  8.56% 
NY 576  8.82%  NY  32  8.65%  NY  165  8.21% 
MA 360  5.51%  IL  31  8.38%  MA  137  6.82% 
FL 328 5.02%  PA 22  5.95% FL  113 5.62% 
NJ 311 4.76%  OH 21  5.68% CO 67  3.33% 
PA 248  3.80%  NJ  18  4.86%  NJ  66  3.28% 
IL 241  3.69% MI 14 3.78% GA 62 3.08% 
MN 212  3.25%  MO  14  3.78%  PA  60  2.99% 
CO 201  3.08%  VA  13  3.51%  IL  56  2.79% 
OH 192  2.94%  FL  12  3.24%  WA  55  2.74% 
GA 178  2.73%  GA  12  3.24%  VA  51  2.54% 
VA 154  2.36%  MN 10  2.70%  MN 48  2.39% 
CT 147 2.25%  CT  9  2.43%  CT  44  2.19% 
WA 131  2.01%  NC  8  2.16%  MD  40  1.99% 
MI 104 1.59%  WA 8  2.16%  NC  29  1.44% 
MD  101 1.55%  MA 7  1.89% OH 29  1.44% 
MO 101  1.55%  MD  5  1.35%  AZ  27  1.34% 
NC 98  1.50%  TN  5  1.35%  MI  23  1.14% 
AZ 91  1.39%  WI  5  1.35% MO 23  1.14% 
TN 81  1.24%  AL  4  1.08% TN  21  1.04% 
WI 72 1.10%  AR  4  1.08% UT 17  0.85% 
OR 70  1.07%  AZ  4  1.08%  NV 15  0.75% 
UT  70 1.07% CO 4  1.08% LA 13 0.65% 
NV  63 0.96% DE 4  1.08%  OR 13 0.65% 
Other  560 8.58%  Other 27  7.30% Other  115 5.72% 
Total 6,530  100%  Total  370  100%  Total  2,010  100% 
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TABLE   2 
 
The Distribution of Incorporations among States  
 
      All publicly traded          Fortune 500              Firms going 



















in state  Percentage 
DE  3,771 57.75% DE  220  59.46% DE  1,364 67.86% 
CA 283 4.33%  NY 22  5.95%  CA  90  4.48% 
NY  226  3.46%  OH  13 3.51%  NV 72 3.58% 
NV 217 3.32%  PA  12  3.24%  FL  58  2.89% 
MN 178  2.73% NJ  11  2.97% TX  45  2.24% 
FL 165  2.53%  VA 9  2.43%  CO 37 1.84% 
TX 147 2.25%  MD 8  2.16%  MN 36 1.79% 
CO 132 2.02%  FL  7  1.89%  WA 34  1.69% 
PA  124  1.90%  IN  6  1.62%  GA 30 1.49% 
MA 118  1.81% CA  5  1.35% MA  27  1.34% 
OH 112 1.72%  GA  5  1.35% NY  22  1.09% 
NJ 111  1.70%  MI  5  1.35%  PA  22 1.09% 
GA 83 1.27%  NC 5  1.35%  OH 19  0.95% 
WA 79  1.21%  NV  5  1.35%  MD  16  0.80% 
VA 74 1.13%  MN 4  1.08%  VA  15 0.75% 
MI 60 0.92%  MO  4 1.08%  NJ  13 0.65% 
WI 57 0.87%  TX  4  1.08%  MI  12 0.60% 
MD 54  0.83%  WA 4  1.08%  TN  12  0.60% 
OR 54 0.83%  WI  4  1.08%  OR  11 0.55% 
UT 52 0.80%  IL  3  0.81%  UT  11 0.55% 
IN 50 0.77%  KS  3  0.81%  NC 10 0.50% 
NC 46 0.70%  KY  2  0.54%  WI  9  0.45% 
TN 39 0.60%  MA 2  0.54%  LA  7  0.35% 
MO 36  0.55%  OR  2  0.54%  MO  7  0.35% 
IL 32  0.49%  HI 1 0.27%  IN  6 0.30% 
Other  230 3.52%  Other  4 1.08%  Other  25  1.24% 
Total 6,530  100%  Total  370  100%  Total  2,010  100% 
 
   Herfindahl index = 3435        Herfindahl index = 3638       Herfindahl index = 4673 
 
 




Location and Incorporation  
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TABLE 4 
 
In-State and Out-of-State Incorporations 
 
   
 






Number of  
Out-of-state 
Incorporations 





          
All firms   2137  32.7%  4393  67.3%  6530 
          
Went public Pre-91  1213 37.3%  2036  62.7%  3249 
          
Went public 91-95  417  32.8%  854  67.2%  1271 
          
Went public 96-00  507  25.2%  1503  74.8%  2010 
          
Fortune 500  110  29.7%  260  70.3%  370 
          
Fortune 100  18  25.3%  53  74.7%  71 
   A-5
TABLE 5 
 












As percentage of all
firms located in this
state 
Number of firms 
located elsewhere 
but incorporate in 
state 
As percentage of 
all out-of state 
incorporations Net  outflow 
AK 2  1  50.00%  2  0.03%  -1 
AL 29  3  10.34%  2  0.03% 24 
AR 20  3  15.00%  0  0.00% 17 
AZ 91  21  23.08%  0  0.00% 70 
CA 1,254 273  21.77%  10  0.19%  971 
CO 201  74  36.82%  58  0.92%  69 
CT 147  17  11.56%  3  0.05%  127 
DC  25  2 8.00%  0 0.00%  23 
DE 27  27  100.00%  3,744  57.57%  -3744 
FL 328 137  41.77%  28  0.45%  163 
GA 178  71  39.89%  12  0.19%  95 
HI 13  6  46.15%  2  0.03% 5 
IA 25 10  40.00%  4  0.06%  11 
ID 15  2  13.33%  1  0.02%  12 
IL 241 27  11.20%  5  0.08%  209 
IN 56 39  69.64%  11  0.17% 6 
KS 35 11  31.43%  8  0.12%  16 
KY 29  7  24.14%  2  0.03% 20 
LA 45  18  40.00%  4  0.06% 23 
MA 360  108  30.00%  10  0.16% 242 
MD 101  25  24.75%  29  0.45%  47 
ME 10  4  40.00%  0  0.00%  6 
MI 104  58  55.77%  2  0.03% 44 
MN 212  158  74.53%  20  0.32%  34 
MO 101  26  25.74%  10  0.16%  65 
MS 14  4  28.57%  8  0.12% 2 
MT 6  6  100.00%  0  0.00% 0 
NC 98  38  38.78%  0  0.00% 60 
ND  4  0 0.00%  0 0.00%  4 
NE 18  4  22.22%  3  0.05% 11 
NH 28  3  10.71%  0  0.00% 25 
NJ 311 80  25.72%  31  0.50%  200 
NM 9  4  44.44%  3  0.05%  2 
NV 63  45  71.43%  172  2.66%  -154 
NY 576 141  24.48%  85  1.43% 350 
OH 192  105  54.69%  7  0.11%  80 
OK 61  22  36.07%  5  0.08% 34 
OR 70  50  71.43%  4  0.06% 16 
PA 248  98  39.52%  26  0.41% 124 
RI 24 6  25.00%  1  0.02%  17 
SC 30  9  30.00%  1  0.02%  20 
SD 7  4  57.14%  0  0.00%  3 
TN 81  33  40.74%  6  0.09% 42 
TX 586 139  23.72%  8  0.13%  439 
UT 70  32  45.71%  20  0.31% 18 
VA 154  56  36.36%  18  0.28%  80 
VT 11  4  36.36%  0  0.00% 7 
WA 131  68  51.91%  11  0.17%  52 
WI 72  52  72.22%  5  0.08%  15 
WV 8  3  37.50%  0  0.00% 5 
WY  9  3 33.33%  12 0.18%  -6 
Total  6530  2137   4393    
Average     38.10%    1.33%     A-6
TABLE 6 
 








Located  in California  4.96 (0.34)***  5.47 (0.40)*** 
log (sales)   -0.04 (0.04)  -0.11 (0.05)** 
Tobin's Q  -0.001 (0.002)  -0.001 (0.002) 
Return to assets  0.014 (0.02)  0.02 (0.02) 
Number of employees  -0.10 (0.04)***  -0.13 (0.05)*** 
Total equity  0.0002 (0.0001)**  0.0003 (0.0001)** 
Went public in 1991-1995  -0.02 (0.18)  0.05 (0.20) 
Went public in 1996-2000  -0.70 (0.18)***  -0.69 (0.2)*** 
Constant -5.69  (0.36)***  
    
2-digit industry dummy  NO  YES 
    
Number of observations  5382  4651 
Adjusted R2 0.4027  0.4405 
    
*, **, ***  Significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence interval, respectively.   A-7
TABLE 7  
 
Factors Inducing Firms to Remain In-State  
 
  Logit regression: 
 
Dependent variable:  
In-state dummy 
  
 1  2 
Firm characteristics:    
log(Sales) -0.025  (0.015)*   0.37 (0.24) 
Tobin-Q  -1.0e-04 (7.0e-04)   0.0003 (0.0007) 
Return on assets  -0.0006 (0.007)  -0.001 (0.007) 
Number of employees  -0.004 (0.002)** -0.004  (0.002)** 
Going public between 91-
95 
-0.26 (0.08)***  -0.26 (0.08)*** 
Going public between 96-
00 
-0.52 (0.08)***  -0.52 (0.08)*** 




log(Population)     0.18 (0.13) 
Number of firms located    -3.0e-04 (3.0e-04) 
Per capita income    -1.8e-06 (1.7e-05) 
    
Interaction:    
log(Sales)*log(Population)   -0.03  (0.015)** 
    
State region:    
Northeast    -0.58 (0.13)*** 
South     -0.36 (0.12)*** 
West     0.31 (0.14)** 
    
Uniformity of laws:    
RMBCA  -0.05  (0.10) 
    
Legal & Political State 
Characteristics: 
   
(see Table 10 column 1)    YES 
    
State Dummy  YES   
2-digit industry dummy  YES  YES 
    
Number of observations  5315  5325 
Pseudo R2 0.1219  0.0777 
    
*, **, ***  Significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence interval, respectively. 
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TABLE 8  
 
Which Firms Migrate to Delaware? 
 
   Logit  regression 
 
 







Return on assets  -7.0e-04 
(0.007) 
Number of employees  0.0004 
(0.001) 
Going public between 91-95  0.43*** 
(0.08) 
Going public between 96-00  0.72*** 
(0.08) 
  
State dummies  YES 
2-digit SIC dummies  YES 
  
Number of observations  5340 
Pseudo R2 0.1092 
  
*, **, ***  Significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence interval, respectively. 
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TABLE 9 
 













Alaska  0 0 0 0  0  0 
Alabama  0 0 0 0  0  0 
Arkansas  0 0 0 0  0  0 
Arizona  4 1 1 3  0  1 
California  0 0 0 0  0  0 
Colorado  1 0 0 0  1  0 
Connecticut  3 0 1 5  0  1 
DC  0 0 0 0  0  0 
Delaware  1 0 0 3  0  0 
Florida  4 1 1 0  1  1 
Georgia  4 0 1 5  1  1 
Hawaii  3 1 0 0  1  1 
Iowa  3 0 0 3  1  1 
Idaho  5 1 1 3  1  1 
Illinois  4 0 1 3  1  1 
Indiana  5 1 1 5  1  1 
Kansas  2 1 0 3  0  0 
Kentucky  4 0 1 5  1  1 
Louisiana  3 1 1 0  0  1 
Massachusetts  4 1 0 5  1  1 
Maryland  5 1 1 5  1  1 
Maine  1 0 0 0  0  1 
Michigan  3 1 1 5  0  0 
Minnesota  4 1 1 4  0  1 
Missouri  4 1 1 5  0  1 
Mississippi 3 1 1 0  0  1 
Montana  0 0 0 0  0  0 
North  Carolina  3 1 1 0  1  0 
North  Dakota  1 0 0 0  0  1 
Nebraska  2 1 0 5  0  0 
New  Hampshire 0 0 0 0  0  0 
New  Jersey 4 0 1 5  1  1 
New  Mexico  1 0 0 0  0  1 
Nevada  5 1 1 3  1  1 
New  York  4 0 1 5  1  1 
Ohio  5 1 1 3  1  1 
Oklahoma  2 1 0 3  0  0 
Oregon  4 1 0 3  1  1 
Pennsylvania  5 1 1 5  1  1 
Rohde  Island  4 0 1 5  1  1 
South  Carolina  3 1 1 2  0  0 
South  Dakota  5 1 1 4  1  1 
Tennessee  5 1 1 5  1  1 
Texas  1 0 0 3  0  0 
Utah  2 1 0 0  1  0 
Virginia  4 1 1 3  1  0 
Vermont  1 0 0 0  0  1 
Washington  3 0 1 5  1  0 
Wisconsin  5 1 1 3  1  1 
West  Virginia  0 0 0 0  0  0 
Wyoming  3 1 0 3  0  1 
Average/total  2.7 27 27 33  25  31 
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TABLE 10 
 




Dependent variable:  
In-state dummy 
   
 1  2  3 
Standard Antitakeover statutes:      
Control share      0.85 (0.11)*** 
Fair Price      -0.24 (0.17) 
No freezeouts (1-3 years)      -0.04 (0.10) 
No freezeouts (4-5 years)      0.74 (0.13)*** 
Poison Pill Endorsement      0.50 (0.10)*** 
Constituencies     -0.04  (0.11) 
Index 0.26  (0.04)***    
Index1    0.42 (0.24)*   
Index2   0.41  (0.31)   
Index3   1.26  (0.26)***  
Index4   1.23  (0.22)***  
Index5   1.65  (0.26)***  
      
Extreme statutes:      
Staggered board  0.49 (0.15***  0.5 (0.16)***  -0.47 (0.27)* 
Recapture  0.16 (0.16)  0.08 (0.22)  0.04 (0.18) 
      
RMBCA  -0.05 (0.10)  -0.07 (0.12)  0.05 (0.10) 
      
“Liberal” political culture:      
Percentage of Democrats  -2.36 (0.86)***  -3.06 (1.25)***  -2.64 (0.99)*** 
      
Firms characteristics (see Table 
7) 
YES YES YES 
      
State Demographic and legal 
characteristics (see Table 7) 
YES YES YES 
      
2-digit industry dummy  YES  YES  YES 
Number of observations  5325  5323  5323 
      
Pseudo R2 0.0777  0.0791  0.0904 
      
*, **, *** Significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence interval, respectively.   A-11
TABLE 11 
 
What Makes States Attractive for Out-of-State Incorporations? 
 
     OLS regression: 
 
Dependent variable: log of 
(1+number of out-of-state 
incorporation) 
   
 1  2  3 
State statutes:      
Control share      0.95 (0.4)** 
Fair Price      -0.17 (0.51 
No Freezeouts (1-3 years)      -0.01 (0.44) 
No Freeze outs (4-5 years)      0.38 (0.51) 
Poison Pill Endorsement      0.70 (0.37)* 
Constituencies     0.33  (0.42) 
Index 0.33  (0.09)***    
Index1    0.99 (0.57)*   
Index2    1.87 (0.67)***   
Index3    1.14 (0.50)**   
Index4    1.68 (0.48)***   
Index5    1.87 (0.55)***   
      
Extreme statutes:    
Staggered board  -0.21 (1.15)  -0.155 (1.16)  -0.03 (1.4) 
Recapture  -0.03 (0.85)  0.16 (0.93)  0.58 (0.95) 
      
RMBCA -0.53  (0.32)*  -0.66 (0.37)  -0.34 (0.36) 
      
“Liberal” political culture:      
Percentage of democrats  -5.72 (2.14)**  -4.26 (2.30)*  -3.42 (2.47) 
      
State Demographic 
characteristics: 
   
Population 7.1e-08  (1.0e-7)  -8.8e-08 (1.0e-07)  -1.1e-07 (1.2e-07) 
Located -0.001  (0.003)  -0.005 (0.003)  0.004 (0.003) 
Per capita income  1.8e-04 (5.4e-05)*** 1.8e-04  (5.5e-05)*** 1.6e-04  (6.5e-05)** 
      
State region:      
Northeast  0.09 (0.52)  0.06 (0.54)  0.30 (0.62) 
South 0.64  (0.40)  0.75 (0.41)*  0.98 (0.47)** 
West 0.80  (0.45)*  0.98 (0.47)**  0.45 (0.50) 
      
Number of observations  50  50  50 
Adjusted R2  0.4453 0.4483 0.4666 
      
      *, **, *** Significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence interval, respectively. 
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TABLE 12A 
 







state       
state    0  1  2 3 4 5  Total 
     
0  1  14 8  6  22 46 97 
  1.03% 14.43%  8.25%  6.19%  22.68%  47.42%  100% 
           
1  6  13  10 13 22 41  105 
  5.71% 12.38%  9.52%  12.38%  20.95%  39.05%  100% 
           
2  0  9  2 0 6  13  30 
  0% 30.00%  6.67%  0%  20.00%  43.33%  100% 
           
3  1  7  2  3  33 19 65 
  1.54% 10.77%  3.08%  4.62%  50.77%  29.23%  100% 
           
4  3  18  13  21  106 115 276 
  1.09% 6.52%  4.71%  7.61%  38.41%  41.67%  100% 
           
5  3  8  1  4  37 23 76 
  3.95% 10.53%  1.32%  5.26%  34.82%  30.26%  100% 
           
Total  14  69  36  47  226 257 649 
  2.16% 10.63%  5.55%  7.24%  34.82%  39.6%  100% 
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TABLE 12B 
 
The Effects of Corporate Migration on Antitakeover Protection 
 
Number of observations: 649 





3.81 0.97  0.8-1.13 
Control Share  0.41 
 
0.63 0.22  0.16-0.28 
Fair Price  0.59 
 
0.77 0.18  0.13-0.22 
No freezeouts  0.69 
 
0.79 0.10  0.05-0.014 
Poison Pill 
Endorsement 
0.56 0.86 0.29  0.25-0.35 
Stakeholders 0.58 
 
0.76 0.18  0.13-0.23 
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TABLE 13 
 
The Division of the Market for Out-of-State Incorporations  
 
          All publicly                    Fortune 500           Firms going public  








































DE 3,744 85.23%  DE  216  83.08%  DE  1,356  90.22% 
NV 172  3.92%  NY  9  3.46%  NV  61  4.06% 
NY 85  1.93%  NV 5  1.92%  CO  18  1.20% 
CO 58  1.32%  MD 4  1.54%  FL  11  0.73% 
NJ 31  0.71%  NJ 4  1.54%  MD 6  0.40% 
MD 29  0.66%  IN  3  1.15%  UT  6  0.40% 
FL 28  0.64%  KS 3  1.15%  NY 5  0.33% 
PA 26  0.59%  PA 3  1.15%  PA  4  0.27% 
MN 20  0.46%  NC  2  0.77%  TX  4  0.27% 
UT 20  0.46%  OH 2  0.77%  GA  3  0.20% 
VA 18  0.41%  VA 2  0.77%  KS  3  0.20% 
GA 12  0.27%  FL  1  0.38%  MN  3  0.20% 
WY 12  0.27%  GA  1  0.38%  NC  3  0.20% 
IN 11  0.25%  HI 1  0.38%  WA 3  0.20% 
WA 11  0.25%  KY  1  0.38%  IN  2  0.13% 
CA 10  0.23%  MA 1  0.38%  NJ  2  0.13% 
MA 10  0.23%  TN  1  0.38%  OR  2  0.13% 
MO 10  0.23%  UT  1  0.38%  TN  2  0.13% 
KS 8  0.18%  Total  260 100%  CA 1  0.07% 
NC 8  0.18%        IL  1  0.07% 
TX 8  0.18%        LA 1  0.07% 
OH 7  0.16%        MI  1  0.07% 
TN 6  0.14%        MO 1  0.07% 
Other  49 1.12%       Other  4  0.27% 
Total 4,393  100%        Total  1,503  100% 
 
Herfindahl index = 7287          Herfindahl index = 6929   Herfindahl index = 8159
  
   A-15
TABLE 14 
 
Delaware’s Market Shares Over Time 
 









Fraction of all 
Incorporations  
      
Pre 1991  62.6%  80.4%  50.4% 
      
1991 – 1995  67.2%  87.9%  59.1% 
      
1996 – 2000  74.8%  90.2%  67.5% 
      
 